Thoughts on the Crisis in Mali by Besenyő, János
The Tuareg rebellions
Since Mali’s independence, the Tuaregs have rebelled several 
times against the government which led to cruel battles and 
considerable sacrifices on both sides (Boukhars 2012, 4-5). 
The first uprising broke out in 1966, because the northerners 
– including the Tuaregs – gained none or only very limited 
positions in the new government, and they also did not fit into 
the socialistic modernization strategy implemented by the 
country’s first president Modibo Keita.1 The new leadership did 
not support the nomadic lifestyle and, similarly to the French, 
they tried to resettle those who followed this nomadic way of life 
(Bondersholt and Gyldenholm 2012, 4-5; Schraeder 2011, 180-
181). The Tuareg lands were taken into state property and the 
government wanted to force them into cultivation by prohibiting 
roaming and grazing livestock, as well as forcing them to liberate 
their slaves. Uprisings by a part of the marginalized Tuaregs 
(the Iforas tribe) were brutally defeated by the government in 
almost two years. The government believed that it could handle 
the situation by military means, thus negotiations between the 
opposing parties were out of the question. About 1,000 Tuaregs 
lost their lives in these clashes and thousands more fled to Algeria 
and to neighboring countries (Keita 1998, 9-11; Humphreys and 
Mohamed 2003, 18). These events have not caught the attention 
of the international community yet, because it was then occupied 
with the developments in the Congo and Cyprus. After putting 
down the rebellion in 1968, a military coup replaced the previous 
government. The new president, Moussa Traoré, introduced 
military governance in the northern territories, where outsiders 
were not allowed to enter until 1987 and any means were allowed 
to suppress the Tuaregs’ independence efforts.
Many young people emigrated to Niger, Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania and Libya due to their herds being devastated by 
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the drought during the period between 1970 and 1987. In these 
countries, they lived in refugee camps for years (Ilahiane 2006, 
40-41, 104-105). They formed the Azawadi and Adrar Tuareg 
Liberation Movement (Mouvement Touareg de Libération de 
l’Adrar et de l’Azawad) that aims at the creation of a Tuareg Azawad. 
The Tuaregs did not receive anything from the aid arriving into 
Mali; it was distributed in the more developed southern areas 
between government loyalists or stolen by particular ministers 
(Imperato 1996, 42-43). This is when the second Tuareg rebellion 
broke out, provoked by the imprisonment of some Tuaregs. This 
uprising was much better organized than the previous one and 
the rebels received almost unlimited support and modern Soviet 
small arms from Libya. The government responded brutally to 
the Tuaregs’ initial success. A state of emergency was declared and 
an immediate attack was launched against the Tuaregs (Imperato 
1996, 235-236). They slaughtered part of the Tuaregs’ and other 
tribes’ herds, which set northern Arabs against them and led to the 
escalation of the conflict. During the rebellion, 6-8,000 people lost 
their lives (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003, 3-4, 19-21). Finally, 
the government realized that it cannot quell the uprising by itself 
with its own armed forces, therefore, with the intermediation of 
the neighboring Algeria the opposing parties started negotiations 
and, on January 6, 1991, they concluded their first peace treaty - 
Accord de Tamanrasset - which had resulted in the immediate 
cessation of hostilities (Bondersholt and Gyldenholm 2012, 40; 
Ilahiane 2006, 119). Later however, the government respected 
only certain parts of the agreement (Lohman 2011, 6-7; Diallo 
2008, 49). A military coup, led by Amound Toumani Touré, 
overthrew the former dictatorial regime on April 11, 1991 and the 
Tuaregs concluded their second treaty - Pact National - with the 
new government led by Alpha Oumar Konaré, which officially 
ended the rebellion. The Tuaregs who undertook the positions 
were integrated into the governmental army or were allowed to 
take public service (Schraeder 2011, 191-193). The atmosphere of 
mutual distrust remained and due to various misunderstandings 
the Tuaregs and the military repeatedly clashed with each other. 
This period lasted until 1996, when the third treaty - Flamme de 
la Paix - was concluded on March 27, after which the opposing 
parties actually ceased hostilities. By this time, the UN Refugee 
Agency resettled the Tuaregs who fled from the fights and the 
drought to refugee camps in Mauritania, back to Mali. The 
government started infrastructural investments in the North - 
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construction of schools and health care facilities, drilling wells, 
etc. - and began to provide greater autonomy for the Tuaregs who 
were now able to join Malian politics.
This period was concluded by the military coup led by 
Amound Toumani Touré in 2002. The observation of the 
agreements with the Tuaregs became less important for the new 
government, turning the Tuaregs marginalized again. In the fight 
against terrorism after 9/11, Mali, as a U.S. ally, announced a fight 
against terrorist organizations operating in the region, as well as 
against smugglers trading in weapons and drugs in the abandoned 
Saharan areas. The Tuaregs, being familiar with the desert, were 
front and center in these activities; therefore, the government 
forces launched several military operations against them, causing 
part of them to join Al-Qaeda (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007, 158-
160; Diarra 2012, 7-8). The proliferation of small arms caused 
frequent clashes between the Tuaregs and their neighbors that 
have gotten bloodier over time. Despite this, the government did 
not pay sufficient attention to the region. Therefore, the fights 
escalated in 2006, when more Tuareg leaders of the Kel Adagh 
tribe deserted from the army and attacked Kidal and Meneka 
on May 23 (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007, 155-156). That day, the 
rebels established the Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change 
(Alliance Démocratique du 23 Mai pour le Changement - ADC), 
that demanded the development of the northern areas and the 
implementation of the treaty signed in 1992. Mali requested the 
mediation of Algeria again; hence on July 4, 2006 they concluded 
the 4th peace treaty - Accord d’Algers – that was in fact the renewed 
version of the 2nd treaty (Boukhars 2012, 11). Similarly, they have 
pledged the development of the northern regions, the integration 
of Tuareg soldiers into the national army, and the withdrawal of 
the government forces to their southern positions. However, part 
of the rebels did not trust the government and they established 
the Tuareg Alliance of Northern Mali for Change (ATNMC), 
which continued the fight. Since the government did not have 
sufficient military force to crush the rebellion, they initiated 
peace talks again. They concluded the 5th agreement in Kidal in 
April 2009, which contained the implementation of the promises 
of the previous four treaties (Bondersholt and Gyldenholm 2012, 
56).
It seemed that the government finally kept its promise. By 
December 2010, the army significantly reduced its garrison in 
the north and also set up a special Tuareg unit. In August 2011, 
2 Programme Spéciale 
pour la Paix, la Sécurité et 
le Dévelopement au Nord-
Mali.
3 Captain Sanogo was 
trained by U.S.  Army and 
he is Lieutenant General of 
the Malian army from 14th 
august 2013.
7.
418
the government approved a program worth 65 million USD for 
development of the northern regions.2 However, no significant 
changes occurred in the North. Smaller armed clashes took place 
between the government and the Tuaregs (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2012, 6, 21, 35). It must be noted that none of the agreements has 
been able to eliminate the marginalization of the Tuaregs and to 
integrate them into the society, laying the foundation for another 
revolt.
The fourth Tuareg rebellion
This low-intensity conflict escalated on January 17, 2012, 
when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) occupied the settlement of Aguelhok and launched a 
comprehensive attack on the government forces stationed in the 
north. The military coup, one month before the election, has 
aided the offensive and facilitated the disintegration of the poorly 
equipped, unpaid military units fighting against the Tuaregs, 
as well as that of the barely functioning government (Besenyő 
2012). Starting from the Kati barracks, led by Captain Amadou 
Haya Sanogo,3 the coup established the National Committee for 
Reconstruction, Democracy and Restoration of the Statehood 
(CNRDR). The group of Sanogo rose up primarily against the 
military leadership’s impotency, the corruption of the country’s 
leadership, the corruptness and nepotism of the political elite, 
and because of the massacre in the northern garrison of Aguelhok 
(Boukhars 2012, 5; McGregor 2012). Even though the committee 
suspended the constitution, the rebels were not able to consolidate 
their power due to disorganization and other internal conflicts. 
The majority of the population rebuffed them, and they were not 
supported by the entire military, either. The social dialogue they 
started failed dismally and the army was forced to give up even 
more territory. The military takeover was not recognized by the 
international community which did not only protest against it, 
but also threatened the leaders of the coup with possible sanctions 
and military intervention. The African Union suspended 
Mali’s membership and the representatives of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) placed further 
pressure on the leaders of the coup to hand over the power to a 
civil transitional government until a new parliamentary election 
is held. They were forced to accept this. All participants in the 
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coup were given amnesty, Amadou Toumani Touré and Sanogo 
resigned and withdrew from public life. The former spokesman 
of the parliament, Diouncounda Traoré, was elected as the new 
president. However, the new government that stepped into office 
in August 2012 did not win the total support of the society and 
the atmosphere remained tense between the military and civil 
administration (Boukhars 2012, 7).
In early April, the various groups - MNLA, the Islamist 
Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) group as well as other Arab 
militias - that launched an armed attack against the government, 
occupied the three northern regions: Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. 
On April 5, 2012, the Tuaregs occupied the city of Douentza. 
The next day they have announced that they have reached their 
objectives and declared the Azawad Republic. They formed their 
government, which has not been recognized by the international 
community.
Gunmen involved in the fighting had been previously fighting 
in the mercenary army of the now toppled Libyan President 
Gaddafi. In late 2011, they fled to Mali along with their armed 
inventory and battle experiences (Besenyő and Marsai 2012, 92-
93), where they launched an attack against the secular government 
almost immediately. These groups allied temporarily against the 
government forces and even collaborated with the local branch 
of al-Qaeda - the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 
However, this alliance was vulnerable since the Tuaregs aimed 
for their own “secular” state; on the other hand, the Islamists 
imagined a country based on religion and Sharia law (Mouaki 
2012). The Islamists started introducing this in the territories they 
have occupied; they destroyed hotels and restaurants – formerly 
places of alcohol distribution – and they mutilated several people 
because of various “offenses.” The Tuaregs did not agree with 
these extremist activities, but the Islamist organizations such 
as Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and for the Jihad for 
Western Africa (MUJAO) and the Nigerian Boko Haram, who 
are also present here, had more armed men and power than the 
Tuaregs (Arieff 2013). Soon the Tuaregs and the Islamists have 
also begun to fight each other.
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The humanitarian situation deteriorated even further. 
After the rebellion broke out in January 2012, more than 
30,000 people fled from their residences within 3 weeks, followed 
soon by tens of thousands of others. The majority stayed in 
areas controlled by the government – mainly in Bamako and 
surrounding areas – and the rest in the neighboring countries of 
Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Togo and Algeria in 
improvised refugee camps. Several thousands of people remained 
in the North hiding in abandoned places, being too afraid to 
leave their small assets behind. Many were murdered trying to 
protect themselves and their families (McGregor 2012; Amnesty 
International 2012a).
Several charges were brought up against the various groups 
occupying the northern territories by the investigative team of 
the Human Rights Watch, reporting from the scene about the 
terrorization of civil society, raping of women and young girls, 
robbing, looting, brutalizing of captured government soldiers, 
and the use of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch 2012; 
Amnesty International 2012b). There is evidence that Tuareg 
and Islamist groups destroyed Christian buildings, and attacked 
Christian minorities living in the country. However, the Islamists 
did not spare the Muslim shrines either; such as the one located 
in Timbuktu – one of the World Heritage Sites – along with the 
600-year-old entrance of the Sidi Jahya mosque (Marsai 2013). 
The introduction of sharia has not only destabilized the public 
law and order, but the accompanying executions, tortures and 
public flogging resulted in more refugees.
Since the outburst of the conflict, more than 420,000 people 
were forcibly displaced, with their supplies with the essentials 
unresolved (Arieff 2013). Part of the refugees remained in Mali, 
but more and more people have been fleeing into the neighboring 
countries, Of the 3.3 million people living in the north, the 
supplies for at least 1.76 million are not ensured as access to food 
is increasingly difficult with prices escalating since the outburst 
of the conflict (ECB Project 2012).
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International reactions
Seeing the military successes and expansion of Islamists, the 
African Union called upon the UN Secretary General to endorse 
the immediate deployment of African troops with a UN Security 
Council resolution to prevent a “West-African Afghanistan” 
(Associated Press 2012). Representatives of the ECOWAS held 
extraordinary meetings agreeing that, if necessary, they would 
deploy organized forces - similarly as it was done in Liberia – to 
restore the legal order, prevent the country’s collapse and provide 
humanitarian aid to Mali and the surrounding states (McGregor 
2012). The organization and the African Union asked for the 
intervention of the UN, seeking authorization to launch an armed 
intervention against the Islamists. The UN reacted positively to 
this request and the Security Council passed a resolution (2071) 
on October 12, 2012 about the occupying Islamist forces in Mali. 
Representatives of Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS) agreed on November 11, 2012 in Nigeria to send 
troops with the support of the UN to recapture the northern 
territories occupied by Islamists (ECB Project 2012). This was 
hard to realize, however, since the organization’s first plan to 
launch a military operation of 3,300 troops was rejected by the 
UN – they only approved planning, organization and gearing of 
troops and equipment gathering. Because of the escalation of the 
conflict, the UN Security Council finally approved resolution 
2085 on December 20, 2012 to launch an African-led International 
Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), an intervention with one-
year mandate. Of course it is questionable what this mission 
can achieve, since the ECOWAS already operates a military 
mission in Guinea-Bissau, where a coup occurred in April 2012. 
The Community has sent peacekeepers to the country to restore 
the civilian government, but the mission’s mandate is not clear, 
and no results have been demonstrated yet. Therefore, it is 
questionable if the Community can play an effective role in Mali. 
There was no consensus between the leaders of the neighboring 
countries, but after several discussions they consistently agreed 
to support the UN’s military intervention with an aim to restore 
Mali’s integrity.
Since 2002, the USA has been co-operating with the 
government on the ”Pan Sahel Initiative” and on its successor, 
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the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) anti-
terrorism program (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007, 143-145; Diarra 
2012, 20). The U.S. considered Mali its most important regional 
partner and a successful example of African democratization, 
and initially it has spoken cautiously about the conflict. At that 
time it did not want to admit that its Sahel policies have failed, 
since in three of the supported countries (Mali, Mauritania and 
Niger) military coups occurred in recent years. Even though the 
U.S. itself planned military intervention in the area, it never 
actually intervened because of the high risk involved (Tisdall 
2013). Later, it joined the ECOWAS-led negotiations, and then it 
provided substantial humanitarian aid for the refugees, but still 
argued against military intervention (Arieff 2013). At the same 
time it increased substantially the military and training support 
provided for the fight against terrorism. Finally, due to the 
strengthening of AQIM and other militant Islamist groups – the 
U.S. does not consider these groups a regional, but a global threat 
– it has taken a limited role in the fight against these groups, 
supporting the neighboring states and initiated operations with 
logistical, reconnaissance and intelligence data, but it is not 
willing to send troops (Borger 2013).
After the proclamation of the breakaway Tuareg state, the 
European Union has instantly indicated that it does not support 
any action that would lead to the disintegration of Mali, and 
approved a plan in which European soldiers provide training 
and logistic support for government forces within the framework 
of a limited military operation. As far as the country’s former 
colonizer, France, was concerned, Mali was still in its area of 
interest despite initial hesitation to intervene in the conflict due 
to the lack of a single point of view in the French government. 
It was only able to agree that it clearly rejected the Tuareg 
independence efforts and supported Mali’s unity. Then, in 
several months of debate, the ”hawks” prevailed and convinced 
the French president, Francois Hollande, to launch a limited 
military operation - “Opération Serval” - against the Islamist 
forces. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon supported this 
operation from the beginning, and on December 20, 2012, the 
UN Security Council passed resolution 2085, thus opening the 
way for the French intervention (Mann 2013).
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The French military operations
The Islamists grew bored with the 2012 year-end stalemate 
and launched an armed intervention this January (2013) against 
Southwest Mali. A total of 1,200 armed men of the three militant 
groups occupied the cities of Konna and Mopti, and already 
posed a threat to the strategically important city of Sévaré.4 The 
country’s demoralized army was unable to stop their offensive 
and, as a result, the alarmed government in Bamako called on 
the former colonial keeper, France, for military intervention, and 
declared a state of emergency on January 13, 2013.
Subsequently, France launched the military operation known 
as “Opération Serval” on January 11, 2013 to stop the attack, to 
ensure the protection of the capital, Bamako, and to help restore 
the country’s unity. The operation, according to Admiral Edouard 
Guillaud,5 and French official statements, will only last till Mali 
and the arriving AFISMA troops are able to take effective action 
against the extremists. The question is: what if the Africans fail in 
Mali, similarly to Burundi and Darfur? Will the French remain 
in Mali or will they entrust Mali’s fate to the luck of the Africans? 
They will likely remain - as it has probably been decided already 
in early January with the decision to intervene. An important 
factor was that although they did not have any units in Mali, 
but had nearly 3,500 soldiers in the surrounding states, stationed 
in the framework of various bilateral agreements (Besenyő and 
Hetényi, 2011).
The first attack against the extremists was launched by the 
4th helicopter regiment in the region of Sevan, where an armed 
military convoy was stopped. The next day, several hundred 
French soldiers joined Mali’s military units in the attack against 
the Islamists, who a couple of days earlier occupied the city of 
Konna. Here they also eliminated one of commanding positions 
of Ansar Dine. The news coverage reported falsely then that the 
city was recaptured, since the disorganized, poorly equipped 
and trained Malian army was unable to take advantage of the 
French air strikes. The government finally gained control of 
the city on January 18. On the same day, French fighter jets also 
bombed Douentza, Lere, Gao and Kidal, where they destroyed 
fighting positions and logistical storages (fuel and weapons). 
4 This is the only city besides 
Bamako where heavy trans-
port aircrafts are able to 
land, which is essential for 
the effective management of 
the humanitarian situation in 
the North or the execution 
of successful peace enforce-
ment and support operation.
5 Admiral Edouard Guillaud 
is the French Chief of the De-
fence Staff, he synchronizes 
the operation in Mali, and 
the operative commander 
since 24th January 2013 is 
Grégoire de Saint-Quentin.
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The helicopters and fighter jets involved in the operation came 
from the French military bases in Chad and Burkina Faso. In 
the first two days of “Opération Serval” at least 100 radicals 
died, compared to only a couple of losses of the French-Malian 
units (BBC 2013b; Mann 2013). The radical groups launched a 
counterattack towards Bamako and occupied the city of Diabaly, 
but due to the increased volume of French air strikes they began 
to retreat not only from the central areas, but also from Gao, 
Kidal and Timbuktu. Nevertheless, the French became more 
cautious, as they were surprised by the training, organization and 
determination of the Islamists equipped with modern arms.
It was worth exercising caution, since the different armed 
groups often hid amongst the civilian population, whom they 
used as a human shield during the attacks, making it very 
difficult to differentiate fighters from civilians, resulting in more 
civilian deaths during the fights (Chrisafis 2013). Nevertheless, 
the French advance continued unhindered. On January 16 
they attacked and recaptured first Markala, then on January 21 
Diabaly and Douentza. At the same time the French reached the 
towns of Niono and Sevan and continued the air strikes, in which 
the Islamists fleeing from their position in Kidal lost several 
vehicles. On January 26, the French special units occupied Gao’s 
strategically important positions (the airport and the Wabary 
bridge) and recaptured the entire city in a few hours. Meanwhile, 
from Diabaly towards Lere and Timbuktu, the French launched 
a unit of 600 troops that the Islamists tried to impede with smaller 
ambushes. After being replaced by the 21th Marine regiment and 
troops arriving from Chad and Niger, the French who captured 
Gao advanced almost immediately towards Timbuktu, whose 
extremist occupiers also retreated by January 28. On the same 
day, the MNLA militants occupied Kidal, Tessalit and Khalil 
which had been left to their faith previously by militants of 
Ansar Dine. The French troops reached Kidal on the night of 
January 29, occupying the city without a fight (BBC 2013a). 
After that, the surviving extremists fled to their hideouts in the 
desert or tried to flee to the surrounding countries. If they want 
to completely eliminate the extremists and prevent them from 
returning to Mali the French and their allies have to prepare for 
desert operations where their air and technical superiority is not 
as evident. This is clearly not a very appealing prospect for the 
French political and military leadership who intend to minimize 
any losses.
THOUGHTS ON THE CRISIS IN MALI 
7.
425
In the French operation, logistical and intelligence support is 
provided by the U.S. (it operates an air bridge with C-17 military 
transport aircraft between France and Bamako, and also provides 
information collected by satellites and drones) and the U.K. (2 
C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft, trainers and consultants, 
a special unit and reconnaissance aircrafts), while Canada, 
Germany, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Belgium, 
Sweden and Denmark provide logistical support. Interestingly 
those states – Italy, Spain – that are the main destinations of 
drugs and illegal immigration originating from Mali, do not 
participate with troops in the operations, and the support they 
have provided so far is not substantial (Applebaum 2013).
Most of the international community considered it necessary 
and accepted the military intervention, but several of the 
opponents talk about a French recolonization of the country. 
This is contradicted by the fact that the majority of Mali’s 
population welcomed the French soldiers, whom they have been 
waiting for to expel the Islamic extremists. On the whole, the 
Muslim world’s reaction is mixed with countries welcoming 
and some even supporting the intervention, such as the United 
Arab Emirates, but many protesting against the ”crusaders”, 
and demanding their immediate withdrawal from Mali. So far 
these opinions were not able to seriously affect Operation Serval 
in which the French have been demonstrating considerable 
professionalism with minimal losses (7 soldiers).
The UN operation
In this operation, the African states have offered 3,500 soldiers 
and financial, logistical and intelligence support is expected from 
Western (European) states. According to the UN plan, the troops 
would arrive by September, but the international community 
was putting increased pressure on the African states to start 
the operation as soon as possible (Tran 2013). The lead country 
of the operation, Nigeria, indicated that even if the African 
teams arrived earlier to Mali, their training and installment 
would take considerable time, so they would not be ready for 
immediate deployment. Some have also questioned the African 
soldiers’ effectiveness in the desert as they come from an entirely 
different environment - rainforests and savannah - and are less 
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6 With these viewpoints I 
agree as well, as in 2005 I 
served as a military advisor 
appointed by the European 
Union in the AMIS (African 
Union Mission in Sudan) 
peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur, where, for similar 
reasons, the African troops 
suffered many casualties in 
clashes with local armed 
groups.
7 Chad sends a mechanized 
artillery regiment of 1200 
soldiers and two logistics ba-
ttalions of 400 soldiers into 
Mali, but not under African, 
but French command. Later 
the Chadians were 2250. - 
TV5/Le Monde cf.: http://
maliactu.net/tchad-le-parle-
ment-vote-le-retrait-des-sol-
dats-du-mali-dans-un-delai-
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8 These are: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
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familiar with desert warfare (Morgan 2013; Abderrahmane 
2012).6 Attention must also be paid to the fact that Islamists 
are equipped with better weapons than the African units whose 
mandate is only for one year. Nigeria, the country with the best 
trained troop contingent, has to realize that domestic support for 
its intervention in Mali is not absolute, and the activity of Boko 
Haram is also intensifying in the country. Because of its internal 
security problems it may even order its soldiers back, but this 
could also happen in the case other African countries do the 
same Perhaps this was also the reason for negotiation attempts 
with the opposing groups, but in the end they could not avoid 
military intervention. On January 18-19, the first 260 African 
soldiers (Nigeria, Togo and Benin) arrived to Bamako, but did not 
participate in the operations yet. According to the preliminary 
agreements, Chad offered 2,000 soldiers,7 while Nigeria 1,200 
(Doyle 2013), Togo 540, Niger 1,200, Senegal and Burkina Faso 
500 and 500 each, Benin 300, Guinea 150, and Ghana 120 soldiers 
to the AFISMA unit established by the ECOWAS.
Inspired by the French success, a meeting was held organized 
by the West African States on January 19 in the city of Abidjan 
in Côte d’Ivoire,8 as well as Chad’s President Idriss Deby, the 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and the representatives 
of the U.S., the EU, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Belgium, 
Burundi, Canada, Egypt, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
South Africa and Tunisia. The participants also agreed that Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone would start 
assembling their troops in Mali (PANA 2013). The member states 
requested immediate financial and logistical support from the 
UN. However, the UN Secretary-General supports this request 
only if the mission’s logistic supply is provided rather by other 
countries in the framework of bilateral agreements. The U.N. 
would take over this activity only in the stabilization period after 
all military operations are concluded. In fact, according to the UN 
Secretary-General, the organization would be unable to perform 
its regional tasks if its employees became the target of AQIM and 
other terrorist organizations (Nichols and Charbonneau 2013).
In a donor conference held in Addis Ababa on January 29, the 
western states offered 455 million USD to support the operation 
of AFISMA (Donors’ Conference on Mali 2013). This amount is 
intended to finance the rebuilding, training, and equipment of 
THOUGHTS ON THE CRISIS IN MALI 
7.
427
the Malian army. According to the African Union, this amount 
will not be sufficient to operate AFISMA; they estimate the costs 
at about 950 million USD (BBC 2013a). So will the international 
community provide financing, and will the Africans succeed 
and stabilize the region? We will only be able to see after the 
withdrawal of French troops.
Conclusion
The question is not whether the military operation will be 
successful, but how the winners would like to consolidate and 
rebuild Mali’s northern areas. The country’s all-time leadership 
must understand that violent and discriminative former methods 
cannot “modernize” the Tuareg society because they create a 
permanent conflict situation. Due to their historical experiences, 
the Tuaregs treat the government authorities with distrust. This 
is why the government needs to find a new approach to remedy 
the problems of the northern region – and of the Tuaregs in it 
– as well as to create a constructive dialogue. This may include 
a limited autonomy, or the transformation of the government 
structure, or even the creation of a stable, functional federal state 
in which the ethnic groups would have greater autonomy and 
political representation. This would require a reliable government 
in Bamako that enjoys the support of all segments of society. If 
this is not realized, then Mali should prepare in advance to the 
next and subsequent Tuareg uprisings.
Luckily, there are political forces that have realized the 
importance of these tools. If the influence of these forces increases, 
they could put the policy of reconciliation into practice. The 
representatives of the MNLA and the Malian government have 
already signed a peace treaty in the capital of Burkina Faso in 
June 2013. The compromise can be attributed mainly to the 
pressure put on the opposing sides by the ECOWAS and France. 
Due to the agreement, Mali’s unity has been restored for now, it 
remains a secular state, and elections will be held.
After the reconstruction of the country, regional cooperation 
also needs to be improved in which the international community 
should take an active part. They need to work together with the 
local countries to eradicate the weapon and drug smuggling in 
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the area and create programs for nomads to replace their income 
from these activities. They then need to establish and effectively 
implement a country-wide disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration program in which they disarm the various groups, 
with special attention paid to child soldiers recruited by Islamists. 
At the same time they need to continue training and equipping 
the forces of the Sahel countries, so they will be able to themselves 
effectively take action against the smugglers and extremists. 
The armed forces should be excluded from politics and used 
only for military, border patrol and other professional activities. 
The Islamists who had fled present yet another problem; where 
will they “exploit” their military experience gained in Mali and 
elsewhere? In how much time will they be able to reorganize their 
groups to cause problems in other West African countries where 
the West has significant political and economic interests? When 
will they be able to carry out terrorist acts, either in France or in 
other European countries that are involved in the operations? 
Considering the events of previous years, the Western world 
must be prepared.
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